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L
ike in several developing economies in the
Asian region, new technologies and the green
revolution were also introduced in Philippine
rural areas in the last decade. This raised
agricultural productivity and rural incomes and triggered
major investments in irrigation, farm-to-market roads, and
input supply distribution. However, for a number of rea-
sons, Philippine agriculture has failed to sustain its short-
lived growth and remained a stagnant sector. In this light,
a program to modernize the agriculture and fishery sec-
tor was launched through the passage of the Agriculture
and Fisheries Modernization Act (AFMA) in December
1997. To increase agricultural productivity, the AFMA was
to introduce modern technologies and provide accessible
inputs and support services such as basic infrastructure,
credit, and information and marketing support. An impor-
tant provision in this law was the creation of an Agricul-
tural Modernization Credit and Financing Program (AMCFP)
that intends to provide sustainable financing to the sec-
tor.
The Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan
(MTPDP) for 2001-2004 recognizes the importance of
an efficient rural finance market and thus identifies rel-
evant policies and strategies to attain this objective. The
key emphasis is on sustainable financing of rural devel-
opment that is anchored on market-based principles and
more effective rural financial institutions. The specific
strategies for rural finance are:
] Increase of access of small farmers, fisherfolk,
upland dwellers and indigenous peoples to credit, includ-
ing long-term financing;
] Promotion of a savings-led approach to agricul-
tural and micro-financing to encourage capital formation2 July 2001
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among farmers, fisherfolk, upland dwellers and indig-
enous peoples, household microenterprises, and rural
banks; and
] "Anchoring" of the Agro-Industry Modernization
Credit and Financing Program (AMCFP), as provided un-
der RA 8435, on market-based mechanisms and pursuit
of the phase out and consolidation of all directed credit
programs as programmed by the Agricultural Credit Policy
Council and the National Credit Council.
The rural finance policies and strategies under the
MTPDP and AFMA are undoubtedly a radical departure
from the subsidized, directed credit programs that gov-
ernment has implemented in the past decades. Philip-
pine policymakers in the 1970s, 1980s and even the
1990s, at times supported or even encouraged by exter-
nal donors, had intervened in the rural credit markets to
direct credit to target sectors at highly subsidized rates
of interest.1
This Policy Notes discusses the current policy frame-
work for rural finance in the light of past experience and
the emerging innovations in the microfinance market. Af-
ter this brief introduction, the next section presents some
trends in access to rural credit. The section on current
rural finance policy framework then follows after a short
critique of past rural credit policies pursued by the gov-
ernment. The final section analyzes policy and design
issues for sustainable Philippine rural finance.
Trends in agricultural and rural financing2
Various surveys conducted by the Technical Board
for Agricultural Credit,3 the Agricultural Credit Policy Coun-
cil (ACPC) and Social Weather Stations (SWS) since 1985
show that, on the average, only 38 percent of farm house-
holds borrow.
Informal and formal sources
Table 1 shows that about one-third (29 percent) of
this percentage of borrowing farm households borrow
from formal sources of credit while the rest have persis-
tently depended on informal sources of credit. The pro-
__________
1Purita Neri and Gilberto M. Llanto. 1985. Agricultural credit sub-
sidy. Central Bank Review.
2This section draws on previous papers by Gilberto M. Llanto and
Ma. Piedad Geron.
3This office was replaced by the Agricultural Credit Policy Council
in late 1986.
portion of households in the rural areas borrowing from
informal sources such as big farmers, moneylenders, trad-
ers, input suppliers, friends and relatives has remained
the same over the years.
On the other hand, while rural banks lend to small
farmers and microenterprises, commercial banks finance
large-scale agriculture. Some private thrift banks cater to
small and medium enterprises located in the countryside.
Government financial institutions such as the Land Bank
of the Philippines lend to private rural financial institu-
tions, e.g., rural banks and cooperatives, on a wholesale
basis. The latter in turn provide retail loans to small farm-
ers and other small-scale economic agents in the credit
market.
Without government funds, it seems that private
banks would not cater to small-scale borrowers. For in-
stance, while total loans granted by formal financial insti-
tutions to the agriculture sector have nominally been in-
creasing since 1980, the ratio of agricultural loans to
total loans granted by the banking sector has drastically
 Period Incidence of Borrowing Formal Informal
1985-85 32 32 65
1986-87 37 28 66
1988-89 44 20 82
1991-92 35 26 85
1992-93 36 32 68
1994-95 33 31 69
1996-97 40 33 67
1997-98 47 24 76
Average 38 29 72
Table 1. Incidence and source of borrowing
(in percent)3 No. 2001-04
Policy Notes
declined from 1980 to 1998—from 22 percent in 1981
to 8 percent in 1983 and further down to less than 1
percent in the late 1990s, signaling a declining amount
of financial resources going to the agriculture sector.
The decline in financing for agriculture and the coun-
tryside was most evident among commercial banks, with
their proportion of loans declining from 6.6 percent in
1986 to only 0.4 percent in 1998. On the part of rural
banks—the major source of loans, volume-wise, for those
in the rural areas that have access to bank lending—the
proportion of agricultural loans granted has likewise been
on a downtrend.
Meanwhile, the Land Bank of the Philippines, the
government bank mandated to serve agrarian reform ben-
eficiaries, has increased the share of agricultural loans
in its total loan portfolio from 7 percent in 1987 to about
30 percent in the late 1990s, in contrast to the trend of
the private bank loan portfolios. This share, however, is
the shift of banks’ loan portfolio from agricultural pro-
duction, i.e., basically rice and corn production, to rural-
based enterprises. Nonfarm activities, especially those
implemented by small and microenterprises, are getting
a fair amount of bank financing for the rural sector. It is
unfortunate that data on loans granted by banks to non-
farm enterprises could not be segregated from the usual
loan data reported by banks since these are usually
lumped with commercial and industrial loans of banks.
But it is possible that the reported bank financing for
countryside development is somewhat understated al-
though the relative magnitude of nonfarm enterprise fi-
nancing is difficult to establish.
Other sources of financing
Aside from banks and informal sources of credit,
government nonfinancial agencies have also provided
credit to the small borrowers in the agriculture sector.
Through directed credit programs (DCPs), the government
attempted to direct the flow of credit resources to tar-
geted sectors for specific purposes.4
 A recent survey conducted by Llanto and others
reported that 86 directed credit programs were imple-
mented by 21 government agencies.5 Executing agencies
may be government line agencies and their attached bu-
reaus, government nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs),
government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs),
and government financial institutions (GFIs). Some of
these programs were implemented through GFIs. Gov-
ernment line agencies own the most number of DCPs,
followed by GFIs. Together, they manage almost 80 per-
cent of the programs, with line agencies overseeing 37
programs and GFIs handling 31 programs. The Depart-
ment of Agriculture handles 12 programs while the Land
Bank of the Philippines handles 21 programs.
__________
4DCPs are credit programs implemented by the government and
funded from sources external to the implementing institutions such as
budgetary allocation, grants or loan proceeds from bilateral or multilat-
eral donor organizations, and whose interest rates are subsidized.
5Gilberto M. Llanto, Ma. Piedad Geron and Ma. Christine Tang.
1999. Directed credit programs: issues and framework for reform. Ma-
nila: Department of Finance, National Credit Council.
still very small considering that the LandBank was geared
to be the government’s financing arm for countryside de-
velopment in the first place. Notwithstanding the supply-
led financing strategy adopted by the government, there-
fore, private banks have chosen to ignore the rural sec-
tor and seem to be more comfortable financing the ur-
ban sector and its various trading and commercial activi-
ties.
A closer look, though, at these bank financing data
for countryside development reveals a noticeable trend—
A closer look at bank financing data for
countryside development reveals a noticeable
trend—the shift of banks’ loan portfolio from
agricultural production to rural-based enter-
prises. Nonfarm activities, especially those
implemented by small and microenterprises,
are getting a fair amount of bank financing
for the rural sector.4 July 2001
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Data on initial fund al-
location for 63 DCPs show
that more than P40 billion,
or 1.8 percent of GNP in
1996, were invested in the
programs of the different
agencies. DCPs in agricul-
ture comprise almost P20
billion or 40 percent of total DCPs. The irony is that de-
spite the huge amount of financial resources directed at
the sector, many farm households still complain of lack
of access to formal credit and thus, continue to depend
on informal credit for their consumption and investment,
including working capital, requirements. DCPs were imple-
mented using subsidized interest rates resulting in very
low cost recovery. Moreover, very low repayment rates
plague these programs, creating a portfolio of
nonperforming loans even as financial discipline was
weakened by the distortions introduced in the financial
markets by DCPs.
The persistence of the share of informal credit to
total agricultural loans also indicates that credit absorp-
tion is a growth issue. This means that the rural economy
has not grown to the extent that it will attract substantial
financial resources from the banking system. The low
productivity of the agricultural sector arising from decades
of neglect as indicated by the low level of public invest-
ments, research and development expenditure for agri-
culture, and others, drives the existing pattern of credit
in rural areas. In this regard, informal credit matches the
funding requirements of subsistence, low growth agricul-
ture. It is therefore not surprising to learn that the huge
amount of public resources poured into subsidized credit
programs has not made a dent on the small scale cli-
ents’ problem of access to formal financing.
The lessons are painful but clear. Among others,
they include:
] the huge fiscal cost of unsustainable DCPs and
weakened financial discipline among borrowers;
] overdependence on cheap funds and neglect of
savings mobilization;
] weakened ru-
ral banking system that
became dependent on sub-
sidized funds;
] inefficient tar-
geting leading to large leak-
ages of subsidies to unin-
tended beneficiaries, e.g.,
big farmers, agricultural technicians, and others;
] overall distortion in the financial market; and
] decades of neglect of the agriculture sector that
thwart any attempt to provide formal financing to the sector.
The painful experience finally prompted the Philip-
pine government to schedule a phase out of all DCPs by
2002. The legal basis for the termination of DCPs was
the AFMA which provided a phase-out schedule for DCPs
in the agriculture sector and Executive Order 1386 which
mandated a similar phase out of DCPs in the
nonagriculture sector. The more important policy reform
was the market orientation of credit policies and interest
rates as provided for in both the AFMA and Executive
Order 138.
Current rural finance policy framework
This section enumerates the government’s interven-
tion measures in the credit markets in the past decades
which sought to direct credit to target sectors. It also
describes the current rural finance policy framework
brought about by the AFMA and Executive Order 138.
Credit allocation, loan targeting, credit subsidies
and directed loans to certain sectors were the hallmark
of the supply-led finance approach in the 1970s and
1980s. Funding was sourced from government budget-
ary appropriations and foreign loans. In the late 1990s,
however, market-oriented financial and credit policy re-
placed the financial repression policies of the earlier
decades.
The persistence of the share of informal credit
to total agricultural loans also indicates that
credit absorption is a growth issue. This means
that the rural economy has not grown to the
extent that it will attract substantial financial
resources from the banking system.
__________
6Issued in August 1999.5 No. 2001-04
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Policies in the 1970s
] Implementation of commodity-specific credit
programs. These programs were intended to meet the
government’s objective of attaining self-sufficiency in food
requirements, particularly rice and corn.7 The loans were
channeled through the Philippine National Bank (PNB)
and the Central Bank (CB) of the Philippines to rural banks
which were given cheap funds for on-lending to small farm-
ers at highly subsidized rates.
] Imposition of mandated credit quotas. Presi-
dential Decree 717 or the Agri-Agra Law, issued in 1975,
mandated banks to set aside 25 percent of their loan
portfolios for agricultural lending, 15 percent of which
should be alloted to general agricultural lending and 10
percent to agrarian reform beneficiaries.
] Use of subsidized interest rates. To lessen the
cost of credit to the agriculture sector, the Central Bank
(CB) opened a rediscounting window offering cheap funds
for loans going to the agriculture sector. Rural banks were
the chief beneficiaries of cheap funds from the CB.
Policies in the 1980s and early 1990s
] Deregulation of interest rates. In 1981, the gov-
ernment initiated a set of financial policy reforms which
deregulated the financial market. Interest rates were de-
regulated and credit subsidies were gradually removed.
The CB rediscounting window, which served as the mecha-
nism for preferential credit allocation, was also closed
and the CB moved out of development financing. The use
of market-based interest rates was adopted as a policy.
In November 1994, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP),
which replaced the CB, issued a circular lifting the ceiling
on lending rates for rediscounted papers covering agri-
cultural production, cottage and small industries and fi-
nancing of working capital.
] Promotion of savings mobilization as source
of loan funds. With the adoption of market-based inter-
est rates, rural banks were expected to reduce their de-
pendence on cheap government loan funds and mobilize
savings as source of their loan funds to the rural sector.
] Consolidation of directed credit programs in
the agriculture sector. In 1986, the different funds used
for commodity-specific agricultural lending were consoli-
dated into the Comprehensive Agricultural Loan Fund
(CALF) by virtue of Executive Order 113. Some 19 funds
administered by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food (MAF)
and the CB were consolidated into the CALF. Funds from
the CALF were used to expand the guarantee operations
of the Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium Enterprises
(GFSME), the Quedan Guarantee Fund Board (QGFB), the
Philippine Crop Insurance Corporation (PCIC) for agricul-
__________
7Masagana 99 and Masaganang Maisan are examples of subsi-
dized credit programs implemented in the 1970s with the key objective of
increasing production of rice and corn.
tural production of small farmers and the Bagong Pagkain
ng Bayan Program for rural-based projects of local gov-
ernment units. The guarantee program was intended to
encourage private sector participation in agricultural lend-
ing by reducing the risks associated with agricultural lend-
ing.
In November 1994, the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP), which replaced the CB, issued
a circular lifting the ceiling on lending rates for
rediscounted papers covering agricultural
production, cottage and small industries and
financing of working capital.
] Implementation of a Rural Bank Rehabilitation
Program. The financially repressive policies and programs
implemented in the 1970s and the 1980s led to mas-
sive loan repayment problems and huge loan arrears
among rural banks participating in the implementation
of commodity-specific credit programs. In 1987, CB Cir-
cular 1143, later amended by Circular 1172, implemented
a rehabilitation program for rural banks. The rural bank6 July 2001
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rehabilitation program under the direction of the Central
Bank of the Philippines required rural banks to provide
fresh infusion of equity as a ticket to the rehabilitation
package which includes, among others, a debt for equity
conversion scheme and a rescheduling of past due obli-
gations with the CB, all intended to improve the balance
sheets of the affected banks. In 1991, the Countryside
Financial Institutions Enhancement Program (CFIEP) was
established through CB Circular 1315. Under the pro-
gram, counterpart capital infusion by LandBank  was made
available to match private capital infusion. Common stock-
holders were, however, exempted from the 20 percent
ownership ceiling, and penalties and other charges on
arrears covered by the program were waived. Finally, the
1992 Rural Bank Act provided for the implementation of
a rehabilitation scheme for rural banks which allowed
the conversion of a rural bank’s arrears with the CB into
government-preferred stocks in the bank. Owners were
required to infuse an equal amount of capital over a pe-
riod of 15 years.
Current policy framework
] Market-oriented financial and credit policies.
With the signing of the AFMA into law in December 1997,
market-based interest rates in the implementation of gov-
ernment credit programs in the agriculture sector were
adopted. AFMA also provided for the phase out of DCPs
implemented by government nonfinancial agencies in the
agriculture sector over a four-year period. The proceeds
from the phased-out DCPs in the sector will be consoli-
dated into the Agricultural Modernization Credit and Fi-
nancing Program (AMCFP), which will then serve the credit
demand of the agriculture sector using market-based in-
terest rates. The program will be implemented through
government and private financial institutions.
] Phase out of DCPs in other sectors. To comple-
ment the provisions of the AFMA on the phase out of
credit programs in the agriculture sector, the government
also issued Executive Order 138 to effectively phase out
all directed credit programs in other sectors and to ter-
minate the participation of nonfinancial government agen-
cies in the implementation of credit programs.8 The EO
also mandates the adoption of market-based financial
and credit policies and the
use of government finan-
cial institutions as the ve-
hicle for the delivery of
wholesale credit to private
financial institutions that
will take care of on-lending
at the retail level. The un-
derlying theme of AFMA
and EO 138 is the use of
the market mechanisms in
the allocation of financial resources and the reliance on
domestic savings mobilization to fund credit programs.
] Advent of microenterprise finance. The failure
of the formal banking system, especially traditional com-
mercial banking and the costly DCPs to provide financing
to the rural sector, led to the evolution of various micro-
financing techniques among private microfinance institu-
tions. Credit-granting nongovernmental organizations,
credit cooperatives and, to some extent, a few rural banks
have utilized microfinance as a sustainable mechanism
to provide basic financial services to small-scale borrow-
ers. This new phenomenon has already taken place in
__________
8The National Credit Council (NCC) recommended the issuance of
the EO to complement the reforms in the rural credit market espoused in
the AFMA. It believes that the phase out of DCPs should be implemented
in all sectors to minimize risks of policy reversals as what happened in the
mid-80s.
The failure of the formal banking system, especially traditional commercial
banking and the costly DCPs to provide financing to the rural sector, led
to the evolution of various microfinancing techniques among private
microfinance institutions. Credit-granting nongovernmental organizations,
credit cooperatives and, to some extent, a few rural banks have utilized
microfinance as a sustainable mechanism to provide basic financial services
to small-scale borrowers.7 No. 2001-04
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several urban areas but still has to prove its usefulness
for rural-based clients involved in farm and nonfarm en-
terprises. The important thing to stress is the success
of private microfinance operation to achieve high levels
of sustainability, given the appropriate financial and credit
policies, and deregulated interest rates, compared to the
rather poor performance of government microcredit pro-
grams, including DCPs, and their failure to attain self-
sustaining operations.
Policy and design issues in Philippine rural
finance
Given the sad experience of the supply-led credit
policy and subsidized DCPs in the past, it is important
that the same mistakes be avoided and that lessons be
learned from such mistakes. The important lesson here
for policy and design initiatives is the reality of policy
reversals and the ever-present threat of such reversal
given populist sentiments and lack of appreciation for
the perverse effects of financially repressive policies. The
passage of AFMA and the issuance of Executive Order
138, meanwhile, indicate the triumph of the financial
markets approach to rural finance with clear emphasis
on market orientation, especially the interest rate policy.
The failure of past interventions has led to attempts
to introduce a market-oriented financial and credit policy
framework. An initial response by private agents is the
emergence of a new class of credit intermediaries—the
microfinance institutions (MFIs) that provide loans with-
out collateral on a moment’s notice and at market-rate
interests to a growing number of small-scale clientele,
mostly nonfarm enterprises and microenterprises. The
MFIs have proven to be sustainable and capable of reach-
ing a large number of assetless, small borrowers who
have viable projects and the determination to repay their
loans on time.
Voluntary savings mobilization is a key ingredient
of this approach. This has equipped private microfinance
institutions with a large liquidity base for funding the as-
set side of the balance sheet. An example is the Center
for Agriculture and Rural Development (CARD) Rural Bank
in San Pablo City which currently has more than 40,000
small borrowers, reports a portfolio at risk of less than
0.05 percent and a large number of small savers who
save on a regular and sustained basis.
The new paradigm, therefore, reflects the economy’s
commitment to financial market liberalization and the ex-
pectation that small-scale clients stand a better chance
of accessing formal financial services under a financial
market framework. In another sense, pushing the finan-
cial frontier à la von Pischke has been made possible by
a number of innovative products, institutions and the open
attitude adopted by the Philippine authorities with respect
to the new paradigm. This can only happen in a flexible,
market-oriented policy setting which is quite different from
the traditional government approach to agricultural and
rural credit programs characterized as (1) rigidly designed
and commodity-oriented; (2) unsustainable though pro-
viding very cheap credit; (3) overly dependent on budget-
ary appropriation and external funding; and (4) dismiss-
ive of savings mobilization on the mistaken belief that
rural households do not save and incomes are so mar-
ginal that such households cannot save.
It is important, however, to point out a threat to the
growth and sustainability of rural financial markets—
government’s inconsistent interest rate policy. While both
the BSP and other government agencies like the National
Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) and the De-
The failure of past interventions has led to
attempts to introduce a market-oriented
financial and credit policy framework. An
initial response by private agents is the
emergence of a new class of credit inter-
mediaries—the microfinance institutions (MFIs)
that provide loans without collateral on a
moment’s notice and at market-rate interests to
a growing number of small-scale clientele,
mostly nonfarm enterprises and micro-
enterprises.8 July 2001
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partment of Finance have supported financial reforms,
especially the adoption of market-based interest rates,
this does not seem to be implemented at the operations
level by government financial institutions. Interest rate
subsidies continue to be provided in some credit pro-
grams implemented by the government.
It is also necessary to review provisions in certain
laws that put caps on lending rates such as the preferen-
tial loans to small landowners, farmers and farmers’ or-
ganizations under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (RA 6657, 1988) and the mandated lending rates to
small farmers not exceeding 75 percent of prevailing
market rates, inclusive of service charges under the
Magna Carta for Small Farmers (RA 7607, 1992). The
government has to resolve the policy inconsistency be-
tween the liberal, market orientation of AFMA and Execu-
tive Order 138, on the one hand, and the provision of
subsidized credit to target sectors under the Magna Carta
for Small Farmers and the CARL, on the other.
A crucial dimension taught by successful micro-
finance programs is the advantage of locally designed
and monitored credit programs over those that are cen-
trally designed and directed. Information asymmetries
tend to break down in localized settings. The application
of collateral substitutes such as peer pressure, third party
guarantees, group dynamics that strengthen loan repay-
ment discipline to noncollateralized lending varies from
area to area. Credit risks and other risks are not neces-
sarily the same and centrally directed credit programs
tend to miss out on the nuances of risk profiles and the
applicable risk mitigation measures that need to be em-
ployed to ensure the integrity of the credit transaction.
Finally, it is also crucial to emphasize the neces-
sary macroeconomic underpinnings of sustainable rural
finance. A stable macroeconomic environment charac-
terized by low inflation expectations is a necessary con-
dition for growth of the financial markets. It encourages
the expansion of formal financial institutions deeper into
the countryside, thereby providing a stronger competi-
tive pressure vis-à-vis informal lenders.9
At the same time, it is necessary to remove barri-
ers to entry to the financial markets in order to introduce
greater competition in the financial marketplace. Com-
petitive financial markets provide more alternative loan
sources and better pricing to borrowers and offer better
returns to savers. They lead to financial deepening and
the improvement of the provision of financial services
and encourage financial innovations—all for the benefit
of the rural finance clientele.  4
__________
9Ponciano S. Intal Jr. and Gilberto M. Llanto. 1998. Financial
reform and development in the Philippines, 1980-1997: imperatives, per-
formance and challenges. Journal of Philippine Development 45 Vol.
XXV (1).